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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the integration process within the European Union retail 
banking sector during the period 1991-2008 by analysing deposit and lending rates to 
households. An important contribution of the paper is the application of the recently 
developed Phillips and Sul (2007a) panel convergence methodology which has not hitherto 
been employed in this area. This method analyses the degree as well as the speed of 
convergence, identifies the presence of club formation, and measures the behaviour of each 
country’s transition path relative to the panel average. We find evidence supporting 
integration in the deposit and short-term mortgage markets but not in the consumer credit 
market and longer term mortgages.  The club clustering tests suggest that the convergence 
process is not homogeneous among countries. In addition, it is observed that the speed of 
convergence is inversely related to the maturity duration for all deposit and lending rates. 
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1. Introduction 
As part of the wider aim for a Single Market for financial services which was launched in 
1992, a single market for EU banking was viewed as pivotal by the European Commission. 
The aim was to facilitate the establishment of pan-European providers of financial products, 
generate greater consumer choice, and boost efficiency and competition, amongst others. At 
the time, major regulatory and institutional reforms were launched and these have been 
revised and reformulated over the years to keep up with an ever-changing and dynamic 
market. The wholesale banking sector has been widely investigated in the literature while the 
retail sector to a much lesser extent. The aim of this paper is to investigate how successful the 
Single Market initiatives have been in creating an integrated European retail banking sector 
by analysing various monthly deposit and lending rates for the household sector for the 
period 1991 to 2008. Given the importance of the household sector as a component of retail 
banking, it is believed that a thorough analysis of deposit, consumer credit and mortgage rates 
with varying maturities can paint a true picture of the convergence process in European retail 
banking.  
 
An overview of the literature, starting from the 1990s to the present, shows a mixed picture 
with regards to investigations on the process of European retail banking integration. Some of 
the earlier studies (Kleimeier and Sander (2000, 2003), Schuler and Heinemman (2002)), 
typically conduct bivariate cointegration analysis on interest rate spreads for different 
household lending and deposit rates. Other studies (Murinde et al, 2000, Adam et al, 2002 
and Vajanne, 2007) draw from the growth literature based on beta and sigma panel 
convergence tests to assess the degree and speed of convergence in the retail household sector. 
The remaining studies (Affinito and Farabullini, 2006, Sorensen and Litchtenberger, 2007, 
Sorensen and Guiterrez, 2006), apply some different techniques such as the tests of 
coefficient equality and hierarchical cluster analysis to euro area retail banking sector. 
 
Overall, for the 1990s period, the evidence in the literature so far paints a picture of a 
fragmented retail banking market. Regarding the more recent period, progress in the retail 
banking integration process is observed. This lends support to the argument that the launch of 
the euro, as well as the initiatives stemming from the Single Market and more recently, the 
Financial Services Action Plan, has been effective. Nonetheless, in most of the recent studies, 
4 
 
the persistence of cross-country heterogeneity is also clearly evident. Limited institutional 
convergence in European banking and the importance of national characteristics, among other 
factors, are considered to be responsible for these results.  
 
In the case of several of these studies, a number of short-comings have been identified. 
Firstly, some of the earlier studies (see Schuler and Heinemann, 2002; Sander and Kleimeier, 
2003) apply time series cointegration analysis to small samples which, as widely argued in 
the literature, result in a loss of power of the test. The same observation is noted for the study 
by Affinito and Farabullini (2006) who apply unit root tests and tests of equality on country 
coefficients on a sample covering 2 years only. Second, the sample periods covered in most 
of the studies stop in the early 2000s except for the one by Vajanne (2007) who considers a 
sample up to 2006. The empirical model used by Sorensen and Litchtenberger (2007) also 
considers data up to  2006 but it must be noted that their analysis is predominantly an 
investigation of the determinants of mortgage rate dispersion rather than a direct assessment 
of the degree of integration within retail banking. Third, none of the studies on retail banking 
integration uses an actual test of convergence except for the application of beta and sigma 
convergence tests drawn from the growth literature1. However, even with the beta and sigma 
convergence methodology, limitations have been identified. For instance, as argued by Quah 
(1996), beta convergence is uninformative on the behaviour of the dispersion of the entire 
cross-section. He further argues that sigma convergence does not factor in the convergent or 
divergent behaviour of individual countries in the sample but is only concerned with how the 
whole cross-section behaves. Hence these convergence tests do not enable the analysis of the 
behaviour of each individual country series over time. Also, as argued by Islam (2003), β- 
and σ- convergence are more relevant within the context of growth literature and he has 
uncovered problems that arise when empirical analysis of convergence are conducted using 
these methodologies.  
We make two major contributions to the literature. First, we present a detailed analysis of the 
convergence process in the retail banking market for both the 1990s and the more recent 
period, 2003 to December 2008, thus enabling a comparison between the new millennium 
                                                          
1
 Developed by Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) in the growth literature. β convergence 
measures the speed of convergence while σ convergence measures the degree of convergence. These 
convergence tests have been used by Adam et  al (2002) and Vajanne (2007). 
5 
 
and the 1990s. Second, we apply the recently developed powerful panel convergence 
methodology by Phillips and Sul (2007a)2, which has not been previously employed in this 
area. This test of convergence, termed as the logt test, is ideally suited for this paper for the 
following reasons. Firstly, this methodology provides an empirical modelling of long run 
equilibria within a hetereogenous panel, outside of the co-integration setup. Secondly, this 
methodology can provide an estimate of the speed of convergence and can also cluster panels 
into club convergence groups. This test would thus not only be able to reveal whether any 
convergence is present within the European banking sector of the EU15 countries but the 
clustering algorithm will, in turn, detect whether any specific group of countries are 
converging or diverging. Thirdly, the test does not necessitate any specific assumptions 
regarding the stationarity of the variables and allows for cases where individual series may be 
transitionally divergent. This information is obtained through the computation of each 
country’s relative transition parameter and the depiction of its transition path which portrays 
the country’s behaviour relative to the panel cross-section average over time. This is very 
significant as it can potentially uncover situations where individual countries may be 
diverging even if as a whole group, convergence is detected.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 outlines the Phillips and Sul (2007a) 
convergence methodology. Section 3 describes the datasets used. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results, while section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Empirical methodology 
 
In this paper we take the view that integration in retail banking is a process whereby 
segmented markets become unified and open and where there is a tendency for prices of 
financial assets to converge over time. The Phillips and Sul (2007a) convergence panel 
methodology has not been previously used in the context of the EU retail banking sector and 
its application brings a new dimension to the study of European banking integration3.  The 
                                                          
2
 See an application in Phillips and Sul (2007b, 2009) 
3A few recent studies have used the Phillips and Sul (2007a) model within the context of the European financial 
market namely, Caporale et al (2009) who investigate convergence in stock returns for 5 EU countries; 
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Phillips and Sul (P&S) model is based on a time varying factor representation. These are key 
aspects of the Phillips and Sul (2007a) model as it does away with the restrictions faced with 
standard unit root and cointegration tests whereby the presence of long-run equilibrium can 
be rejected because of shorter data panels due to data limitations. For instance, cointegration 
will not be detected in cases whereby the variables of interest may be converging over time 
but the speed of convergence is not fast enough to reflect cointegrated behaviour. The 
Phillips and Sul model will, however, be able to detect the presence of co-movement and 
convergence. This methodology can thus be described as an asymptotic cointegration test that 
models long run equilibrium while allowing for individual heterogeneity which can evolve 
over time. In particular, this feature of the Phillips and Sul methodology makes it superior to 
the beta and sigma convergence test as the P&S test allows for both common and individual 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, the Phillips and Sul methodology is better suited for this analysis 
as the time varying component of this test not only reveals the speed at which retail 
integration is taking place, if present, (which is also indicated by the beta and sigma 
convergence tests) but also highlights the different extent and speed of the integration level in 
the group of countries through the process of club formation.  
 
2.1 Relative transition paths 
Panel data for a variable itX  can normally be decomposed into two components comprising 
systematic components, itg , and transitory components, ita , as follows: 
 
ititit agX +=           (1) 
The main procedure in the Phillips and Sul convergence test is to calculate the time-varying 
loadings, itg  and to do so, Phillips and Sul (2007a) reformulates equation (1) such that 
common and idiosyncratic components are separated as follows: 
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Antzoulatos et al (2008) who analyse the convergence of non-interest income in the EU countries; Higson et al 
(2009) who explore the convergence in the European equity markets; and Fischer (2009) who measures price 
convergence in the European Monetary Union.  
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Where tµ is a single common component and itδ is a time varying idiosyncratic element. 
Hence, itδ  measures the economic distance between the common trend component tµ and 
itX . To test whether the components of itδ are converging, Phillips and Sul (2007a) define 
the transition coefficient as ith and information about the time varying factor loadings itδ  can 
be extracted as follows: 
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The so-called relative transition parameter ith  measures itδ  in relation to the panel average 
at time t and therefore describes the transition path for country i relative to the panel average. 
Moreover, the convergence process can be graphically illustrated by plotting the transition 
parameter for each country over time.  
 
However, macroeconomic variables often contain business cycle components which render 
the representation in (3) inappropriate. Hence, following Phillips and Sul (2007a) 
recommendation, the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter is used to filter out the cycle component 
in the interest rate data series and then work out the filtered transition coefficients ithˆ . 
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) demonstrate that higher frequency data require a higher value 
for the smoothing parameter. In this paper the value of lamda is set to 14400, as suggested in 
the literature4 for monthly data.  
 
2.2. The Log t regression 
The log t regression test of convergence tests for the null hypothesis of convergence: 
 
δδ =iH :0  and 0≥α  
Against the alternative  
 
δδ ≠iH :1  for all i or 0<α  
                                                          
4
 For instance, in Eviews, the default value for lamda is 14400 for monthly data. 
8 
 
 
Phillips and Sul’s (2007) procedure involves three steps, as listed below.  
 
Step 1: The cross sectional variance ratio 
tH
H1
 is calculated as follows: 
∑
=
−=
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H
1
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Step 2: The following OLS regression is performed: 
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Where L(t) = log(t+1) and the fitted coefficient of log t is αˆ2ˆ =b , where αˆ  is the estimate of 
α in H0. The data for this regression starts at t =[rT] with some r > 0. Based on the results of 
their Monte-Carlo simulations, Phillips and Sul (2007a) recommend r = 0.3.  
 
Step 3: A one-sided t test of null 0≥α  using bˆ and a standard error estimated using a 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator. The test statistic bt ˆ is 
normally distributed and hence at the 5% level, the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected 
if bt ˆ <-1.65.  
 
2.3. Club convergence algorithm 
Following Phillips and Sul (2007a) argument that a strict rejection of the null of convergence 
may not necessarily rule out the existence of sub-group convergence within the panel, the 
authors have developed a club convergence algorithm to detect such units of clusters. In the 
scope of this paper, this methodology will bring new insight into the convergence process 
within the EU15 retail banking sector by revealing whether clusters of convergence are 
present. If present, then the relationship within the clusters based on economic or structural 
characteristics can be further explored.  
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Phillips and Sul (2007a) clustering algorithm is based on repeated log t regressions and 
contains four main steps which are described below. 
 
Step 1: The itX  series in the panel are ordered according to the last observation, iTX . 
 
Step 2: A core group is formed by selecting the first k highest panel members to form the 
subgroup Gk for some N> k ≥ 2 and the convergence test statistic bt ˆ (k) is calculated for each 
k. The core group size k* is chosen by maximising bt ˆ (k) under the condition that min{ bt ˆ (k)} > 
-1.65.  
 
Step 3: Once the core group is formed, each remaining country is then added separately to the 
core group and the log t test is run. If the corresponding test statistic, bt ˆ is greater than a 
chosen critical value, c5, then the country is included in the current subgroup to form a new 
group. The log t test is run for this subgroup and if bt ˆ  is > -1.65, the formation of this 
subgroup is completed. Otherwise, the critical value c is raised and the procedure is repeated.  
 
Step 4: The log t test is run on the group of countries not selected in step 3 and if convergence 
is detected within this new cluster, a second club is formed. Otherwise, in the case of 
rejection, steps 1, 2 and 3 are repeated on the remaining countries. If no other subgroups can 
be detected, it can be concluded that the remaining countries diverge.  
 
 
3. Data sets and variable definitions  
 
Eleven monthly deposit and lending interest rate data sets for the households have been 
compiled for up to 15 EU countries6 for the purpose of this paper. Due to limited availability 
                                                          
5
 Phillips and Sul (2009) suggest setting c to zero when T is small to ensure that it is highly conservative. 
However, for large T, c can be set at the asymptotic 5% critical value of -1.65. Given that the number of 
observations in this paper ranges from 72 to 142, c is set at 0.  
6
 Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Germany (DE), France (FR), Finland (FR), Italy (IT), Ireland 
(IE), Greece (GR), Luxembourg (LUX), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE) and the 
United Kingdom (UK).  
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of data for the other EU countries, the empirical analysis conducted in this paper focuses on 
the group of 15 EU member states only. Several of the data sets have been compiled into two 
sub-periods. The first period starts in January 1991 or April 1995 and ends in December 2002. 
The majority of the interest rate data for this sub-period has been sourced from the European 
Central Bank’s (ECB) database entitled “National Retail Interest Rates” and some missing 
data has been supplemented by data from the IMF, the Central banks and Datastream. The 
ECB discontinued this database in 2002 and replaced it by a more harmonised database 
entitled “MFI Interest rates” which starts in 2003 and runs to-date. The second sub-period 
starts in January 2003 and ends in December 2008. The bulk of the data series in the second 
sub-group have been sourced from the ECB’s new harmonised database and the remaining 
data supplemented by data obtained from central banks.  
 
The following datasets have been compiled for the household sector: 
• Short-term deposit rates (1991-2002) 
• Consumer loans (1995-2002) 
• Mortgage rates with 2-5 years maturities (1995-2002) 
• Mortgage rates with 1-5 years; 5-10 years; and over 10 years maturities, respectively 
(2003-2008) 
• Consumer credit with up to 1 year; and 1-5 years maturities, respectively (2003-2008) 
• Deposit rates with up to 1 year; 1-2 years; and over 2 years maturities, respectively 
(2003-2008) 
 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Phillips and Sul (2007a) log t-test7 
Phillips and Sul (2007a) recommend conducting the convergence log t-test on filtered data 
series in order to remove the cycle component of each series. The Hodrick-Prescott (1997) 
                                                          
7The Gauss codes for the computation of the logt test and convergence clubs are available from Sul’s website,  
http://homes.eco.auckland.ac.nz/dsul013/.  
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filter is thus employed for this purpose. The t-statistics obtained for the convergence test for 
the 4 categories of deposit rates; the 3 categories of consumer credit rates; and the 4 types of 
mortgage rates ranging from the period 1991/5-2002 and 2003-2008 are tabulated in Table 1. 
Of noteworthy importance is the fact that the magnitude of the convergence coefficient, bˆ , 
provides key information on the rate of convergence. Basically, the higher the value of bˆ
,
 the 
faster the rate of convergence.  
 
First, with regards to the short-term deposit rates for the period 1991-2002, the null of 
convergence cannot be rejected. As for the household deposit rate series with up to 1 year; 1-
2years; and > over 2years maturities for the period 2003-2008, the null of convergence 
cannot be rejected as well. These results point to strong convergence in the European Union 
retail deposit market since the 1990s. Furthermore, based on the value of the convergence 
coefficient, the rate of convergence is highest ( bˆ  = 1.607) for the deposit rates with the short-
term maturities for the 2003-2008 period while the slowest rate of convergence ( bˆ  = 0.102) 
is noted for the deposit rates with the highest maturity duration for the same period.  
 
Second, regarding the 3 panel data sets for the consumer credit rates for the period 1995-2002, 
and 2003-2008, the log t-test rejects the null of convergence for all 3 categories of consumer 
loans. These results suggest that group convergence was not present in the household 
consumer credit market in the 1990s and throughout the years 2000-2008. These results are 
not surprising given the highly segmented consumer credit market in the 1990s due to 
differences in national legislations, credit reporting systems, lack of cross-border credit 
transfers, and varied importance of consumer credit across the Member States. For instance, 
with regards to legislations, the Consumer Credit Directive which was adopted in 1987 was 
based on the principle of minimum harmonisation. This resulted in Member States 
establishing different national legislation which in turn, became obstacles to the provision of 
pan-European products (European Commission, 2005). Another stark example of the 
differences in national legislations is the treatment of bankruptcy cases. For example, in 
France and Germany, personal bankruptcy is treated within the national bankruptcy 
regulations while in other Member States such as Spain, a customer cannot declare as 
bankrupt (Lanoo and Munoz, 2004).  
 
12 
 
In addition, the credit reporting systems across the EU is quite diverse. As reported by the 
Expert Group on Credit Histories in the Member States, there are generally three main types 
of credit reporting systems; private systems, public systems and dual systems (combination of 
public and private systems) (European Commission, 2009). Additionally, cross-border data 
information sharing through credit registers is limited within the EU and this obviously limits 
the opportunities for both providers of credit and potential customers. During the 1990s, 
sharing of cross-border credit data was even more limited and initiatives to facilitate cross-
border data exchanges were only rolled out in the years 2000s mostly.  
 
Moreover, in the 1990s, the system for cross border payments was largely fragmented and 
posed a major impediment to the integration of the consumer credit market. In 1999, the 
common large-value payment system, TARGET, was launched but for retail low-value 
payments, a large number of diverse payment systems are still in existence. Another factor 
that can explain the limited convergence in the consumer credit market is the heterogeneous 
nature of the European consumer credit markets, where the importance of consumer credit 
varies substantially among the Member States. For instance in the UK, consumer credit, as a 
share of GDP, represented was around 14% in late 1990s while for Austria and Germany, for 
the same period, it was around 12%. In sharp contrast, for some other EU countries such as 
Belgium, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands, consumer credit was well below 6% 
(Lannoo and Munoz, 2004). This can be largely attributed to cultural differences and attitudes 
to credit within the EU. Overall, these factors may be responsible for the absence of panel 
convergence, as evidenced by the log t- test.  
 
Third, regarding the mortgage rates, convergence is detected for both the 1995-2002 and 
2003-2008 periods, except for one panel data set; the 2003-2008 mortgage rates with over 10 
years maturity. In addition, the magnitude of the convergence is faster for the short-term 
mortgages rates ( bˆ  =0.521) and lower for the medium term mortgage rates (bˆ  =0.389) and 
negative for the mortgage rates with longer term maturities (bˆ  =-0.099). On the whole, the 
log t-test results indicate that the European residential mortgage market is integrated since the 
1990s but that no convergence is present for mortgage rates with long-term maturities. The 
group convergence results obtained for the mortgage rates with longer maturities can also be 
explained through economic theories on term structure of interest rates, such as the 
13 
 
expectations theory and the liquidity preference theory. According to the expectations theory, 
long-term interest rates are determined by market expectations about the trajectory of future 
short-term interest rates and inflation rates. Hence, an upward sloping yield curve, for 
example, would imply that the market expects short-term interest rates to rise (Pilbeam, 
2010). Within the context of European mortgage interest rates, Bondt et al (2005) show that 
long term retail bank interest rates adjust not only to short-term interest rates but also to long 
term market interest rates. Their analysis is based on an error correction model that looks at 
long term mortgage rates in ten8 EU countries. The authors argue that in the presence of 
uncertainty with regards to future monetary policy changes, banks adjust their long-term 
retail interest rates in line with a target long-term money market rate which would better 
incorporate any expected future changes. Their argument also proposes that interest rate 
exposure due to a mismatch in maturities for assets and liabilities will thus be limited.  
 
Hence, the conclusion that can be conjectured from this analysis is that if the pricing of long 
term retail banking products depends on long term market rates which incorporate sovereign 
risk, then diversity among the mortgage rates of individual member states will exist. Also, 
banks are likely to price their long term retail products based on individual bank’s perception 
and management of interest rate risk and therefore, the more diverse the pricing behaviour of 
banks, the less integrated the retail market is bound to be.  
 
The second theoretical explanation for the limited convergence in long-term mortgage rates is 
the liquidity preference theory whereby longer term interest rates not only reflect market 
expectations but also include a risk or liquidity premium to factor in the higher level of risk 
for the lender. Martin-Oliver et al (2007) investigate the retail banking rate differences among 
Spanish banks for the period 1989 to 2003 using the relative and absolute law of one price 
and find that credit risk premium which is part of the marginal costs of loans is an important 
explanatory factor for dispersion among loan rates for various banks. Furthermore, based on 
an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, the study finds that loan maturity is an important 
determinant of interest rate variability. Overall, based on their findings, the authors 
extrapolate that differences in credit risk policies would have a significant bearing on 
                                                          
8
 AT, BE, DE, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LUX, NL, PT 
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European retail banking integration. A similar conclusion was also reported in the ECB (2006) 
report which compares the differences between the yield curve for different instruments of 
varying maturities and the euro area yield curve in order to measure the impact of the 
maturity duration. The findings show that the period of maturity does indeed have an impact 
on the mortgage rates to households. Hence the underlying implication is that the duration of 
interest rate maturity may very well influence the lending rate by reflecting credit risk. This 
would, in turn, explain cross-country differentials. 
 
4.2. Club clustering test and transition paths 
Having established the presence of convergence in all of the deposit sets and most of the 
mortgage sets but none in the consumer credit panel sets, the next step in the analysis is the 
application of the Phillips and Sul (2007) clustering algorithm test which would identify 
countries that are converging together or diverging. The strength of this test is that even if the 
whole panel of 15 countries do not converge as a block, sub-group convergence, if present, 
may still be detected. Hence, retail banking integration should not be ruled out just on the 
basis of the log t-test but must be analysed together with the club clustering test results. The 
test statistics are reported in Table 2, and discussed below together with the third component 
of the test which is the calculation of each country’s filtered relation transition coefficient, ℎ. 
This transition coefficient illustrates the path taken by each country’s filtered series vis-à-vis 
the panel average over the time period investigated. Consequently, this procedure provides 
additional information on the convergence process in the European retail banking. 
 
4.2.1.  Short term deposit rates: 1991-2002 
As discussed in Section 4.1 above, the panel of 14 EU countries converge as a group for the 
short-term deposit rates for the 1991-2002 period. The clustering test reveals that the series 
for most of these countries belong to the same club. Two sub-groups have been identified; the 
first club groups Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, France, Finland, 
Sweden, Greece, Netherlands, UK while a second club includes Ireland and Italy. Regarding 
the speed of convergence, it is observed that a much faster rate of convergence is detected for 
the first club (bˆ =1.509) compared to the second club which actually show a negative rate of 
growth (bˆ =-0.017). On the whole, combined with the log t-test results, the club clustering 
results indicate that strong convergence is detected for these deposit rates. As for the filtered 
15 
 
transition coefficients ℎ of each individual country’s deposit series, as shown in Figure 1, 
some interesting observations can be made.  
 
For instance, at the start of the period, most of the countries’ time paths start either well 
above or below the cross section average. However, by the late 1990s, a distinct clustering of 
the transition paths can be noticed. Some countries such as Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Spain and Portugal actually show some erratic behaviour and this can actually be linked to 
the heterogeneous nature of the domestic retail market in these countries. For instance, the 
lack of convergence for the deposit rates series for Ireland can be attributed to a lack of 
competition such as little price competition paid on personal current accounts, high switching 
costs and unclear procedures with regards to admitting new members to the payment clearing 
system. This would act as a disincentive for new entrants. In addition, customers in Ireland 
have reported that proximity to their retail banks as well as family history with a specific 
provider are important determinants in choosing their retail bank (European Commission, 
2006). In Spain, on the other hand, savings banks have to uphold social obligations and 
channel funds to community and social projects. More specifically, these banks must allocate 
at least half of their profits to reserves and the rest to social projects. In Netherlands, on its 
part, it is cooperative banks that dominate the domestic retail banking landscape. As an 
example, Rabobank, a large cooperative bank, takes almost 40% of all private savings 
(European Commission 2007). Overall, although strong convergence is present for the 
deposit rates for the 1990-2002 period, it seems that the process did not kick-start until the 
late 1990s. 
 
4.2.2.   Deposit rates (1 year maturity): 2003-2008 
The sub-club convergence tests reveal the presence of only one cluster, grouping all 15 
countries, for the short term deposit rates for the period 2003-2008. A fast speed of 
convergence is also observed ( bˆ =1.523). These strong convergence results are depicted in 
Figure 2, where it can be observed that the deposit series for the panel of 15 countries are 
closely clustered and moving asymptotically towards one, especially towards mid 2000. The 
other noticeable fact is that the transition paths for UK, Sweden and Italy start by moving 
away from the cross-section average but end up converging along the same lines as the other 
countries in the panel.  
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With regards to the UK, the unique characteristics of the UK banking market such as a 
generally higher concentration and profitability ratios; a significantly lower savings ratio 
(linked to developments in the housing market) compared to the EU average, combined with 
the fact that it is outside the Euro-zone could well explain the divergent path undertaken by 
UK’s deposit rates at the start of the period investigated. However, towards the middle of 
2004 and 2005, the transition path takes a dramatic turn and starts converging towards the EU 
cross-section average. This turn of event coincides with the numerous regulatory reforms that 
were undertaken by the UK during this period. As reported by the British Bankers 
Association (2004), over the period 2005, the UK banking industry was going to address and 
implement several European legislation and regulation such as 28 EU Directives stemming 
from the Financial Services Action Plan, the Consumer Credit and Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directives, General Insurance and Mortgage regulation, Basel II Accord and the 
new Capital Adequacy Directive, a review of consumer credit Act, and a revised Money 
Laundering Rules and Regulations, amongst others. It can thus be argued that these major 
regulatory reforms have catapulted the UK’s integration within the EU banking sphere 
around mid 2000s.  
 
The divergent path undertaken by Sweden’s rates at the start of the period can be explained 
by the upheavals which took place in the Swedish banking market in the 1990s and which 
lasted up to mid 2000s. Triggered by the onset of the banking crisis in the early 1990s, the 
Swedish government embarked on a major programme to privatise and reform the public 
banking sector. This culminated into significant structural change which saw the break-down 
of the separation between savings and cooperatives banks. In 1997, Swedbank (formed by the 
merger of several regional savings banks and privatised in 1995), merged with the 
cooperative sector to become a leading player, alongside the other three big banks. Further 
reforms were pursued between 1998 to 2003, which ultimately transformed the Swedish 
banking sector from a fragmented banking market to a more competitive more. Since, the 
Swedish banking market has stood out as being highly concentrated, acutely competitive and 
highly profitable (Polster, 2004a). Hence, it can be advanced that the lack of convergence 
witnessed in Sweden’s rates at the beginning of the period until 2004-2005, can be attributed 
to the major structural and consolidation programme going on at the time. The focus was on 
the domestic market rather than on the European banking sector. Since, other developments 
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such as the expansion of other distribution channels such as online banking, further increases 
in lending and an increase in foreign activities especially in the Nordic countries seem to 
have taken Sweden’s path towards the rest of the EU countries.  
 
In the case of Italy, along the same vein as above, the initial move away from the cross-
section average could be attributed to the major deregulation and privatisation reforms that 
were kick-started in the late 1990s. This resulted in the creation of universal banks and a 
much more competitive Italian banking market. These reforms were also a product of the 
EU’s intended programme for a single market in banking which would eventually lead to the 
entry of new competition in the Italian banking market. Consequently, the Amato Law of 
1990 was launched and by 1992/3, the 83 savings banks had been transformed into public 
limited companies. However, the newly privatised banks were still largely under the control 
of the state. Subsequently the Ciampi Law of 1998 was passed to increase the efficiency of 
the Italian banking market by changing the organisational structure of the banks. The new 
privatised banks had until 2003 to dismantle their existing structure and reduce the state’s 
stake. During this period, various other laws and regulations were launched and adopted to 
further boost the efficiency and competitiveness of the Italian banking sector. As a result, 
several mergers and acquisitions also took place (Polster, 2004b). Hence, the subsequent 
convergence in the transition path for Italy can be attributed to the positive results of the 
consolidation and privatisation programme in the domestic market.  
 
4.2.3.  Deposit rates (1-2 years’ maturity): 2003-2008 
The clustering test results for the deposit rates with medium-term maturities for the 15 EU 
countries shows a similar convergence process as for the deposit rates with shorter-term 
maturities. Once again, all 15 EU countries belong to just one sub-club pointing out to retail 
banking integration in this market. However, the speed of convergence is much slower for 
this panel set ( bˆ  =0.881). This fairly pronounced degree of convergence is also illustrated in 
the behaviour of the panel of countries’ transition paths  (Figure 3). It can be observed that, at 
the start of the period, the transition paths for UK and Sweden diverge from the cross-section 
average of one but slowly moves towards the average around 2005. This was evident too for 
the deposit rates with shorter maturities and the same reasons, as discussed in Section 4.2.2, 
can be cited as explanations for such behaviour.  
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4.2.4.  Deposit rates (>2years’ maturity): 2003-2008 
With regards to the household deposit rates with over 2 years’ maturity, once more, just 1 
sub-cluster is identified, grouping 13 out of the 14 countries in the sample but a much slower 
speed of convergence is noted. The 14th member, Ireland, is actually identified as a divergent 
country. The clustering test results are in line with the Phillips and Sul (2007) log t-test result 
which showed that the deposit rates with longer maturities have slower rate of convergence 
(bˆ  =0.198) compared to deposit rates with shorter-maturities ( bˆ  =1.523). These results point 
to a  mixed picture on the convergence process for this dataset this observation is also 
highlighted in the illustration of each country’s transition path for this panel (see Figure 4). It 
is clearly visible that the 14 EU countries have different convergence behaviour over the 
whole period.  
 
The major observation here is that the convergence process seems definitely slower or more 
diverse when deposit rates with longer maturities are tested as opposed to deposit rates with 
shorter maturities. The explanation for the variation in the convergence process can be drawn 
from a theoretical perspective. As widely discussed, long-term interest rates reflect financial 
market expectations of future inflation, economic developments and interest rates set by the 
central banks. Hence, by inference, long-term interest rates are determined by economic 
conditions at country-level and as such wide disparities are bound to exist between the panel 
of 15 EU countries. This would, in turn, translate into weaker integration with the retail 
banking sector. Moreover, as discussed in various interest pass-through literature, given the 
nature of the retail banking sector where regulatory and institutional barriers are rife, retail 
banking rates tend to adjust more slowly to competitive market rates. Of particular interest is 
the study by Sorensen and Werner (2006) who apply the Pedroni cointegration test to model a 
relationship between euro-area saving deposit rates and market rates. They find that the 
adjustments for the deposit rates are so sluggish that no long-run relationship with the market 
rates can be detected. The authors also attribute these results to differences in national 
regulations such as ceilings on rates and tax exemptions.  
 
Another relevant study is the one by Gropp et al (2007) who investigate the adjustment 
process of retail euro area deposit spreads relative to the national inter-bank deposit rates and 
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find that bank spreads for deposit rates with varying maturities (including long-term) adjust 
sluggishly to market rates. Importantly, the authors also reveal that control variables such as 
bank soundness, credit risk and interest rate risk have a significant influence on the speed of 
pass-through. Moreover, they also find that competition among banks triggers a faster pass-
through. Therefore, based on these findings and the Phillips and Sul (2007) test results as 
discussed above, another notable inference that can be drawn here is that the lesser the degree 
of competition, the lesser the resulting degree of retail banking integration.  
 
4.2.5.  Consumer credit rates: 1995-2002 
As discussed in Section 4.1, the hypothesis of convergence in the panel of consumer credit 
rates for the period 1995-2002 is rejected by the log t-test. The clustering algorithm, on its 
part, however detects that sub-group convergence among the panel of countries is occurring. 
Three small sub-groups are identified. The first one groups Belgium, Germany, France, 
Portugal and UK ( bˆ  = 0.220). The second club comprises Austria and Spain (bˆ  = 0.279). 
The third club consists of Finland and Sweden ( bˆ  = 1.068). Hence, even though the panel of 
9 countries are not converging as a group, they are nonetheless converging within separate 
clusters and at different speeds. The clustering of the sub-groups is quite interesting, as it 
seems to indicate the importance of regional proximity in the consumer credit market. For 
instance, the first club groups Belgium, Germany and France. In their hierarchical cluster 
analysis undertaken in the euro area, Sorensen and Guitierrez (2006) find similar results for 
these 3 countries. Furthermore, the grouping in the third club (Finland and Sweden) may also 
be reflecting geographical and structural similarities.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the countries’ transition paths, as depicted in Figure 5, show no common 
behaviour for most of the 1995-2002 period. Towards the start of the years 2000, it can 
however be observed that the transition paths for most of the countries in the sample are 
slowly moving towards the cross-section average. The lack of integration in the consumer 
lending market for the 1990s period has already been discussed in Section 4.1.  
 
4.2.6.  Consumer credit rates (1 year maturity): 2003-2008 
Along similar lines as the findings discussed in Section 4.2.5 above, sub-club convergence is 
also detected for the short-term consumer credit rates for the 2003-2008 period. Two clusters 
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are identified. The first one groups Austria, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. Even though, the grouping for this first cluster is large, 
the rate of convergence, on the other hand, is extremely weak ( bˆ  =0.002). The second cluster 
consists of Belgium, Germany, Greece, UK and Luxembourg and again a slow rate of 
convergence is noted (bˆ  =0.348). So even though the whole panel of short term consumer 
credit is not converging, as evidenced by the log t-test, the club clustering test reveals the 
presence of club formation, albeit with slow convergence rates in both clusters. 
Unsurprisingly, the countries’ transition paths for the consumer credit rates for this period 
show a range of diverse and scattered transition paths (see Figure 6). No specific clustering 
around the cross-section average can be detected for this panel of countries. These results are 
similar to those obtained by Vajanne (2007) who also rejects the hypothesis of convergence 
for consumer credit rates with shorter maturities. Her study finds that the spreads for this 
instrument category are very large and attributes these findings to the variety of credit 
products that exist in the European Union.  
 
 
4.2.7. Consumer credit rates (1-5 years’ maturity): 2003-2008 
With regards to the consumer credit rates with medium-term maturities for the period 2003-
2008, 2 sub clusters are identified by the Phillips and Sul (2007) club clustering algorithm. 
The first club groups Austria, Portugal, and UK. The second club comprises Belgium, 
Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
and Sweden. Once more, slow rates of convergence are noted for the two clusters (( bˆ = 0.277; 
bˆ = 0.187 respectively). It can be observed that the sub-clustering is quite pronounced for this 
dataset and in this sense, similar to the previous panel data set. Furthermore, it can also be 
observed that Belgium, Germany, and Luxembourg (including France for this data set) 
belong to the same cluster in both panel sets. As for the rest of the countries, they seem to be 
moving in and out of different clusters depending on which data set is tested. Hence, no 
consistent pattern is evident.  
 
The seemingly haphazard clustering of the 15 EU countries and the diversity observed in the 
transition paths for the countries (see Figure 7) could be interpreted as follows. Firstly, the 
importance of regional proximity in the provision of cross-border banking services may have 
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an impact on consumer credit integration. Secondly, these results could also reflect the 
inherent national characteristics of retail banking such as varying market structures, and legal 
and regulatory framework, amongst others.  
 
4.2.8.  Mortgage rates (2-5 years’ maturity): 1995-2002 
With regards to the mortgage rates with 2-5 years maturity for the 1995-2002 period, the 
Phillips and Sul (2007) algorithm identifies two clubs. The first one groups Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and UK while the second club 
groups Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg. With regards to the speed of convergence, a much 
faster convergence rate is noted for the second club (bˆ =4.893) compared to the first club 
grouping most of the countries (bˆ =0.333).  
 
As seen in Figure 8, the path of the transition coefficients for the panel of countries for the 
short-term mortgage rates for the 1990s period, underpin the positive convergence results 
obtained under the log t and club clustering tests. From the behaviour of the convergence 
paths, it is evident that convergence was less pronounced at the start of the period but became 
more clustered towards 1999/2000. The paths for Italy and Portugal in particular have a high 
positive slope initially but eventually merge with the rest of the panel towards the cross-
section average. The move towards the cross-section average for most countries towards the 
end of the period coincides with the initiatives of the Single Market programme and the 
launch of the euro.  
 
4.2.9.  Mortgage rates (1-5 years’ maturity): 2003-2008 
Based on the club clustering test results, the convergence process in the short-term mortgage 
rates continue unabated in the 2003-2008 period. One cluster regrouping all of the 15 EU 
countries is identified (bˆ =0.221). This clearly points to close convergence for this type of 
mortgage rate. The transition paths for the short-term mortgage rates, shown in Figure 9, 
highlight the convergence detected in this panel for most countries. However, the behaviour 
of the time paths for 4 countries (Sweden, UK, Spain and Greece) needs mentioning. Firstly, 
it can be observed that the transition coefficients for Sweden and UK start by moving away 
from the panel cross section average but change course around 2005. These patterns have 
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been observed in the case of the deposit rates and the explanations for such behaviour have 
already been discussed in Section 4.2.2.  
 
In the case of Spain, a study by Sorensen and Werner (2006), which looks at the interest rate 
pass-through for various mortgage rates for the euro-area countries, makes the observation 
that the mortgage rates for Spain tend to adjust more slowly than other countries. 
Interestingly, this fact is corroborated in Figure 9 in the illustration of Spain’s transition path. 
Furthermore, the housing boom that took place in Spain during the period under investigation 
cannot be ignored. Spain consistently showed the highest proportion of residential investment 
as a share of GDP (EMF, 2009). Additionally, compared to the other European countries, in 
Spain and in Greece, repayments periods tend to be shorter and a greater proportion of short-
term fixed rate mortgages are available as opposed to variable rate mortgages (Miles, 2003). 
Another feature that sets the Greek mortgage market apart from the rest is the fact that the 
country has generally one of the lowest residential mortgage debt to GDP ratio among the EU 
15 countries (EMF, 2009).  
 
 
4.2.10. Mortgage rates (5-10 years’ maturity): 2003-2008 
The panel for mortgage rates with medium-term maturities for the 2003-2008 period also 
show closely clustered convergence patterns for the 15 EU countries. The clustering 
algorithm reveals only one sub-club grouping all the 15 EU countries. The speed of 
convergence ( bˆ =0.281) is also similar to that of the 1-5 years mortgage panel for the same 
period. The transition paths, as illustrated in Figure 10, for the mortgage rates with medium 
term maturities show general similarities between the countries in the sample, with some 
concentration visible around the cross-section average. Interestingly, it is also apparent that 
the behaviour of the transition coefficients for Spain and Greece take different paths from the 
rest of the group. The reasons cited above in Section 4.2.9 provide an interpretation for these 
two countries’ paths.  
 
4.2.11. Mortgage rates (> 10 years’ maturity): 2003-2008 
The Phillips and Sul (2007) club clustering test actually rejects the null of convergence for 
the mortgage rates with longer term maturities for the 2003-2008 period. A negative rate of 
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convergence is also noted ( bˆ =-0.363). These results are in tune with the log t-test which 
showed no group convergence this panel set of 11 countries. Along the same vein, the 
transition paths depicted in Figure 11, show the very diverse behaviour of the transition paths 
of the countries in the panel. For instance, Spain’s and Denmark’s transition paths start with a 
negative slope but change direction around 2005 to continue on an upward slope. The 
opposite can be observed for UK and Greece. Overall, it can be observed that the mortgage 
rates with longer maturities show no convergent behaviour as compared to similar 
instruments with shorter maturities. Based on the analysis of the weak results discussed in 
this section as well as evidence drawn from both a theoretical perspective and based on 
anecdotal information, this paper puts forward the view that no convergence is present for 
longer-term mortgage rates in the EU retail banking sector.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this paper is to conduct a thorough empirical investigation of the convergence 
process in European retail banking sector by analysing deposit, consumer credit and 
mortgage rates to the household sector for the period 1991 to 2008. An important 
contribution of this paper is the application of the Phillips and Sul (2007a) convergence 
methodology, which has not been previously employed in the literature on European banking 
integration. The use of this panel test is a major contribution of this paper as the Phillips and 
Sul (2007a) methodology not only detects the presence and degree of integration but also 
provides an estimate of the speed of convergence. Additionally, the club clustering algorithm 
indicates whether sub-groups of countries are converging or showing divergent behaviour. 
The Phillips and Sul (2007a) regression-based tests of convergence provide both flexibility 
and robustness due to the time varying factor representation. This panel methodology is 
superior to the commonly used time series cointegration approach and other convergence 
methods such as the beta and sigma convergence tests as it models long run equilibrium 
while allowing for individual heterogeneity over time. Hence, this procedure brings a novel 
and deeper insight into the study of the European retail banking sector.  
 
The main findings of the paper are as follows. First, convergence is detected in the retail 
banking sector for the household market, especially in the deposit and short-term to medium-
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term mortgage markets. Based on results obtained, it can asserted that this convergence 
process has mostly gathered momentum in the late 1990s and shows unimpeded growth up to 
the end of the sample period, i.e. 2008. Second, the consumer credit market shows signs of 
being the most heterogeneous market throughout the sample period (1991-2008). A slow 
speed of convergence is detected at sub-group level but none is found at group level. Based 
on the club convergence results, geographical proximity and similarities in structural 
characteristics may be the determining factors in this case. Third, another notable fact is that 
relatively faster speed of convergence is observed for the panels with shorter maturities 
compared to the longer term ones. This is evident for all the different panels of deposit, 
consumer credit and mortgage rate data but even more so for the panel on mortgage rates 
with the longest maturities, which exhibit outright divergent behaviour. We put forward 
several arguments drawn from a theoretical perspective on the term structure of interest rates 
such as the expectations and liquidity preference theories in support of this finding. Fourth, 
while group convergence is identified for most panels, the club clustering tests and the 
countries’ transition paths reveal that the convergence process within the panel of 15 EU 
countries is not homogeneous. Indeed, club formation is detected within 6 out of the 11 
panels; with countries typically moving in and out of clusters. The transition paths also 
illustrate some diversity in the convergence patterns especially for instruments with longer 
maturity durations. 
 
Our empirical results highlight some policy implications. For instance, we find that the credit 
market is heterogeneous and associate it with various limitations such as the use of different 
credit registers, differences in the degree of collateralisation and the complications stemming 
from the “minimum approach” principle behind the first Consumer Credit Directive. Once 
these limitations are addressed, the degree of competition and contestability in the household 
credit market would increase and so would the integration process. However, on the whole, 
any policy initiative will not only have to address market contestability but also cultural 
differences, the existence of information asymmetries, and the strength of the bank customer 
relationship, amongst others. Otherwise, cross-country differences will persist.  
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Table 1. Phillips and Sul (2007a) Log t test 
 
t
t
utbatL
H
H
Log ˆlogˆˆ)(log21 ++=−





 
Data series bˆ  t-statistics 
Deposit rates 
• 1991-2002 panel set 
• 2003-2008 (1yr)panel set 
• 2003-2008 (1-2yrs)panel set 
• 2003-2008 (>2 yrs) panel set 
 
0.785 
1.607 
1.027 
0.102 
 
24.108 
9.200 
10.706 
10.154 
 
Consumer credit rates 
• 1995-2002 panel set 
• 2003-2008 (1yr) panel set 
• 2003-2008 (1-5yrs) panel set 
 
 
 
-0.077 
-0.050 
-0.215 
 
 
 
-3.824* 
-5.967* 
-20.425* 
 
 
Mortgage rates 
• 1995-2002 (2-5yrs) panel set 
• 2003-2008 (1-5yrs) panel set 
• 2003-2008 (5-10yrs) panel set 
• 2003-2008 (>10yrs) panel set 
 
 
0.587 
0.521 
0.389 
-0.099 
 
 
7.100 
17.424 
14.866 
-1.692* 
 
Note: a) The Phillips and Sul (2007a) log t-test were run in OxEdit using the Gauss code programmed by Sul 
(2007);  
b)* Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% significance level;  
c) The results are generated using Ox version 4.00 (see Doornik, 2005). 
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Table 2. Phillips and Sul (2007a) Club Convergence Test 
t
t
utbatL
H
H
Log ˆlogˆˆ)(log21 ++=−





 
 
 Data series bˆ  t-statistics 
1991-2002 short-term deposit panel data set 
 
Club 1: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, 
France, Finland, Sweden, Greece, Netherlands, UK 
 
Club 2: Ireland, Italy 
 
 
1.509 
-0.017 
 
 
16.152 
-0.647 
2003-2008 (1yr mat.) deposit panel data set 
 
Club 1: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, UK 
 
 
 
1.523 
 
 
11.341 
2003-2008 (1-2yrs)deposit panel data set 
 
Club 1: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, UK 
 
 
0.881 
 
16.067 
2003-2008 (>2 yrs) deposit panel data set 
Club 1: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
UK 
 
Divergent country: Ireland 
 
0.198 
 
 
16.454 
1995-2002 consumer credit panel data set 
Club 1: Belgium, Germany, France, Portugal, UK 
Club 2:  Austria, Spain 
Club 3:  Finland, Sweden 
 
0.220 
0.279 
1.068 
 
5.331 
7.527 
3.345 
2003-2008 (1yr) consumer credit panel data set 
Club 1: Austria, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden 
 
Club 2: Belgium, Germany, Greece, UK, Luxembourg 
 
0.002 
 
0.348 
 
0.065 
 
10.843 
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Table 2 Cont’d   
Data series bˆ  t-statistics 
2003-2008 (1-5yrs) consumer credit panel data set 
Club 1:  Austria, Portugal, UK 
Club 2:  Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden 
 
0.277 
0.187 
 
12.013 
5.684 
 
1995-2002 (2-5yrs) mortgage panel data set 
Club 1: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, UK 
 
Club 2:  Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg 
 
0.333 
 
4.893 
 
4.156 
 
22.906 
2003-2008 (1-5yrs) mortgage panel data set 
Club 1: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, UK 
 
 
0.221 
 
5.916 
2003-2008 (5-10yrs) mortgage panel data set 
Club 1: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, UK 
 
0.281 
 
8.653 
 
2003-2008 (>10yrs) mortgage panel data set 
Club 1: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, 
France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, UK 
 
-0.363 
 
-12.394* 
 
 
Note: a)The Phillips and Sul (2007a) club clustering log t-test were run in OxEdit using the Gauss 
code programmed by Sul (2007). 
b)  * Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% significance level. 
c) The results are generated using Ox version 4.00 (see Doornik, 2005). 
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Figure 1. Transition paths for each country’s ST deposit rates (1991-2002)                Figure 2. Transition paths for each country’s 1yr deposit rates (2003-2008) 
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Figure 3. Transition paths for each country’s 1-2yrs deposit rates (2003-2008)             Figure 4. Transition paths for each country’s >2yrs deposit rates (2003-2008) 
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Figure 5. Transition paths for each country’s consumer credit rates (1995-2002)           Figure 6. Transition paths for each country’s 1yr consumer credit rates (2003-2008) 
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Figure 7. Transition paths for each country’s 1-5yrs consumer credit rates (2003-2008)     Figure 8. Transition paths for each country’s 2-5yrs mortgage rates (1995-2002) 
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Figure 9. Transition paths for each country’s 1-5yrs mortgage rates (2003-2008)  Figure 10. Transition paths for each country’s 5-10yrs mortgage rates (2003-2008)  
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Figure 11. Transition paths for each country’s >10yrs mortgage rates (2003-2008)   
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